The platform

Four security surfaces, one correlated risk model

Each pillar stands on its own. Together they produce the context no single scanner can see — which is what makes a reachability verdict possible in the first place.

Code security

Find it before it merges — SAST, SCA, secrets and IaC

Static analysis, dependency intelligence, credential detection and infrastructure-as-code review run on every pull request, so the class of problem that is cheapest to fix is caught while the author still has the context.

  • SAST across modern languages with data-flow and taint tracking
  • Software composition analysis with transitive dependency mapping
  • Secrets detection before merge, with a rotation path attached
  • IaC scanning for Terraform, Kubernetes and container definitions
  • Findings annotated in the PR, not in a separate console
pull request #2841Code
CVSS 9.8
CVE-2025-41722 · lib/serializer
Deserialization on the checkout path · called from 3 entry points
Reachable
SECRET
stripe_live_key · .env.staging
Committed 4 days ago · rotation PR drafted
Reachable
IaC
aws_security_group · 0.0.0.0/0:22
Terraform plan blocked at merge gate
Blocked
Cloud posture

Posture, entitlement drift and the paths that actually lead somewhere

Continuous inventory of accounts, resources and identities across AWS, Azure and GCP. Misconfiguration and privilege drift are ranked by what is genuinely reachable — from the internet, or from a role an attacker could already hold.

  • CSPM across accounts, regions and resource types
  • CIEM: entitlement mapping, privilege drift and unused permissions
  • Internet exposure analysis down to the workload
  • Blast-radius scoring for every misconfiguration
  • Drift alerts routed to the team that owns the account
aws · 14 accountsCloud
EXPOSED
ecs/payments-api · public ALB
Internet-facing · task role can read 2 S3 buckets with PII
Reachable
CIEM
role/ci-deployer · privilege drift
Gained iam:PassRole 11 days ago · unused since
Escalation
CSPM
rds/analytics-eu · no encryption
Private subnet, no route to internet
Contained
Runtime defence

What is actually running, and what it is actually doing

Anomaly detection on live workloads closes the loop between build time and production. A CVE that is present in a repository but never deployed is noise; the same CVE running behind a public load balancer is an incident waiting to happen.

  • Workload behaviour baselining and anomaly detection
  • Build-time findings matched to running containers and hosts
  • End-to-end attack paths from entry point to sensitive data
  • Live confirmation that a fix actually removed the exposure
  • Signals shared with Datadog, Splunk and your SIEM
prod-eu · 2 clustersRuntime
RUNTIME
payments-api · outbound to 185.­22.­x.­x
First observed connection · not in baseline · container started 6m ago
Investigate
LINKED
CVE-2025-41722 confirmed in production
Build-time finding matched to a running workload in 2 clusters
Reachable
PATH
Attack path · ALB → task → role → bucket
4 hops from internet to sensitive data
Priority 1
AI security

Discover the models and agents nobody registered

AI systems are moving into production faster than any governance process around them. Securefase discovers models, agents and shadow AI across the estate, then assesses posture, data exposure and policy the same way it does any other workload.

  • Shadow AI discovery across code, cloud and SaaS integrations
  • Model and endpoint posture assessment
  • Data-exposure checks on prompts, payloads and training sources
  • Agent permission review — what can it reach, and change?
  • Policy controls and approval gates for AI in production
ai inventoryAI
SHADOW AI
3 unregistered model endpoints
Called from support-tools · no data classification policy attached
Unmanaged
DATA
Customer records in prompt payloads
PII detected in 1,204 requests over 7 days
Exposure
AGENT
Autonomous agent with write scope
Holds repo write and deploy permissions · no approval gate
Review

One platform in place of five point tools

Free tier gives one repository and five scans a month, so evaluation runs on real code — not a sandbox.